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Summary. — This paper uses a survey of 932 rural households to uncover how the rural credit 
market operates in four provinces of Vietnam. Households obtain credit through formal and 
informal lenders, but formal loans are almost entirely for production and asset accumulation. 
Interest rates fell from 1997 to 2002, reflecting increased market integration; but the 
determinants of formal and informal credit demand are distinct. Credit rationing depends on 
education and credit history, but we find no evidence of a bias against women. Regional 
differences are striking, and a ‘one size fits all’ approach to credit policy is clearly inappropriate.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam has come a long way since the doi moi reform process was initiated in 1986, and the past 
15 years have witnessed one of the best performances in the world in terms of both economic 
growth and poverty reduction. People’s living standards have improved significantly, and the 
country’s socio-economic achievements are impressive. Wide-ranging institutional reforms have 
been introduced, including greater reliance on market forces in the allocation of resources and the 
determination of prices. A shift can also be noted from an economy dominated by the state and co-
operative sectors to a situation where the private sector and foreign investment account for a 
relatively high proportion of GDP. Important strides have been made over a relatively short time 
span to further the transition from a centrally planned to a socialist market economy.  
 
Nevertheless, Vietnam remains a poor country. Some 70 percent of the population continues to live 
in rural areas, and they depend on agriculture for their livelihood. How the country can transform 
itself and its agricultural sector to a more modern society remains a critical policy challenge. Access 
to credit for smallholders is as elsewhere a key ingredient in the promotion of agricultural 
production and transformation, and it forms an essential element of any poverty oriented strategy 
for the future development of the financial system.1 Yet, little is known about the rural credit 
market, including both its degree of efficiency and the extent to which credit rationing impedes 
agricultural development. Appropriate development of market institutions based on well informed 
policies is a key prerequisite for success in Vietnam’s ongoing transformation from a command-
type to a more market based economy.  
 
In this paper we provide on this background a detailed review and an in-depth econometric analysis 
of how the rural credit market operates in four provinces of Vietnam, with a focus on basic 
characteristics and differences between the formal and informal credit markets.2 We use a new 
survey of 932 households designed to elicit the full credit history of households during 1997 to 
2002. These data are combined with information from the 2002 Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey (VHLSS) in the econometric analysis, where the determinants of credit demand 
and credit rationing are identified more rigorously. We are able to account carefully for possible self 
selection, and inter alia ask whether any gender bias exists in credit rationing. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. After describing the data in Section 2, we provide in Section 3 a 
detailed descriptive overview of the characteristics of the rural credit market with a focus on the 
division between formal and informal credit. The data set has a time dimension, so trends during the 
1997-2002 years can be spelled out, including developments in overall interest rates. In Section 4, 
we apply the econometric framework to identify the determinants of credit demand, and proceed to 
analyse in Section 5 household characteristics, which potentially influence the probability of being 
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credit rationed. Some key policy measures to further the allocation of rural credit in Vietnam and 
develop the credit market overall are discussed in the concluding Section 6.  
 
2. DATA 
 
Key data used in this paper (including in particular information on the demand for credit) were 
generated in a comprehensive household survey of land, labour and credit markets in the provinces 
of Long An, Quang Nam, Ha Tay and Phu Tho. The survey, also known as the ILSSA Access to 
Resources Survey,3 was carried out in the first quarter of 2003 in collaboration among the Institute 
of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), Mekong Economics, the University of Copenhagen 
and the Stockholm School of Economics. A total of 932 rural households were surveyed. These 
households are identical to the rural households previously interviewed in quarter 1 and 2 in the 
rural areas of the four provinces under study here as part of the nationally representative 2002 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS).4 In the VHLSS 2002, data were collected 
on income, expenditure and various other background variables. This largely pre-determined 
information is used in this paper in combination with our own data, collected about a year later to 
construct explanatory variables.5
 
The four provinces studied are located in four different regions of Vietnam as follows: (i) Long An 
in the fertile Mekong Delta, which is also the most densely populated of the four provinces; (ii) 
Quang Nam in the sparsely populated Central Highlands; (iii) Phu Tho in the North Western 
(Highlands), a mountainous region with a high share of ethnic minorities, and (iv) Ha Tay in the 
Red River Delta surrounding Hanoi, the Capital of Vietnam. The ILSSA survey is not nationally 
representative, but it is representative for rural households in the four provinces under study. They 
cover a lot of the variation in geographical and socio-economic conditions present in Vietnam, 
including regional differences between the north, centre and south of the country. 
 
The ILSSA survey covered a large variety of topics related to land, labour and credit. In this paper, 
we rely on the credit component, including a number of illuminating questions on the source and 
use of loans, designed to elicit the full credit history of households during the recent past.6 The 
general purpose of this part of the questionnaire was to help clarify the functioning of rural credit 
markets in Vietnam and to assess the extent to which credit rationing constrains agricultural 
development.7 Questions covered issues such as (i) number of loans applied for and actually 
received, including information on amounts involved, interest, period and source of the credit, (ii) 
whether the household had at some point wanted to apply for a loan, but refrained from doing so, 
and (iii) various other relevant background such as the use of the loan, collateral requirements etc. 
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3. THE RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
 
Due to the design of the questionnaire the credit history of each household in the sample can be 
followed. Table 1 shows the distribution of households by the number of loans obtained. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Over the period from the beginning of 1997 to 2002, a total of 289 households did not obtain any 
credit at all. However, 69 percent of the sample (643 households) obtained at least one loan, and 
around 46 percent (432) obtained more than one loan. Table 1 also reveals that there are marked 
differences among the four provinces. In Quang Nam less than 50 percent of the households 
obtained a loan, whereas 71 percent secured at least one loan in Ha Tay. In Phu Tho and Long An 
around 80 percent of the households participated in the credit market. If we focus on households 
with more than one loan, Ha Tay and Phu Tho are quite similar with more that 50 percent having 
more than one loan. In Quang Nam only 7 percent of the households obtained more than one loan in 
contrast to Long An where the corresponding share is more than two thirds.  
 
Of the 289 households, who did not participate in the credit market during the period under study, 
only 12 got a loan application rejected, and another 65 reported having at some point refrained from 
applying even though they wanted credit. Thus, many of the 289 households can be seen as not 
effectively demanding credit. In sum, the overall picture emerging from Table 1 is that an active 
rural credit market exists in Vietnam and that regional differences are sizeable. 
 
(a) General trends  
 
The supply side of the rural credit market in Vietnam includes a number of formal and informal 
lending institutions. The Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (BARD) is the biggest 
formal lender, and the much smaller Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) is associated with BARD.8 
VBP specialises in lending to poorer households. The credit market in many developing countries is 
characterised by segmentation in formal and informal sectors (see for example Zeller 1994 and 
Yadav et. al. 1992), and Table 2 shows that there is a sizeable informal credit sector in Vietnam. 
The informal sector consists of private money lenders, friends and relatives,9 responsible for 35 
percent of all loans in 2002.  
 
In terms of loan amounts, the importance of the informal sector declined from 21 percent in 1999 to 
17 percent in 2002, but measured by the actual number of loans the relative importance of the 
informal sector actually increased slightly. The figures in Table 2 compare well with previous work 
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on credit markets in Vietnam. Duong and Izumida (2002), using data from a small household 
survey undertaken in 1995, found that the informal sector accounted for 17 percent of all loans. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
‘Others’ include private banks, which have expanded rapidly in the south of Vietnam in recent 
years, and the sector composition of the rural credit market differs markedly among provinces. In 
Long An the formal sector provided 96 percent of the total loan amount in 2002 whereas only 64 
percent came from the formal sector in Phu Tho, as further discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
In what follows, we divide the rural credit market into three different segments, one formal and two 
informal. The formal segment includes all formal institutions,10 while the informal sector consists of 
(i) private lending by unrelated individuals and friends charging interest, and (ii) lending from 
families, relatives and friends carrying zero interest. These two segments will be referred to as 
‘private’ and ‘family’ in what follows. The distinction between friends, who lend and charge 
interest, and friends, who lend charging zero interest, may seem arbitrary. However, the data reveal 
a marked discontinuity at zero interest. Friends, who lend and charge interest, charge on average 
only slightly less than private money lenders (not characterised as friends).  
 
To illustrate developments in the rural credit market in the late 1990s and early years of the new 
millennium, Table 3 shows the number of loans, the average loan size (in nominal terms) and the 
average monthly interest rate for the three different segments, year by year. The nominal overall 
volume of credit expanded rapidly by a factor of 2.6 in the years from 1999 to 2002. During this 
period Vietnam experienced an average annual consumer price inflation rate of around 1 percent, so 
the credit volume in real terms grew at about 3 percent less than the nominal growth. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Looking at the number of loans disbursed in the period, relatives and the informal sector increased 
their share from 29 to 36 percent, but in terms of loan amounts formal sector lending increased 
significantly. Formal credit accounted for 76 percent of total rural credit in 1997. By 2002 this share 
was 83 percent. The remaining 17 percent was divided almost equally between informal loans and 
loans from relatives. 
 
The trend described above is mirrored in the development of loan sizes in the three segments. While 
loan size increased steadily in the formal sector, it remained almost constant for friends and 
relatives and decreased substantially in the interest bearing part of the informal sector. 
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Table 3 also allows us to investigate the development in loan terms. One striking feature is that 
overall interest rates have fallen – and more so for informal sector loans. The interest rate gap 
between the formal and informal sector was around 0.9 percentage point (per month) in 2002. The 
relatively large fall in the interest rate in the informal sector (for interest bearing loans) is clearly 
related to the general increase in rural incomes, which made borrowing less risky. This has tended 
to push interest rates down, and the same goes for the increase in formal credit possibilities during 
the period. Another factor behind the interest rate fall is that monopoly rents obtained by private 
moneylenders are likely to have fallen in line with increased market integration. Increased access to 
collateral (in the form of red books, which are land tenure certificates issued by local authorities) 
have squeezed profit margins and the degree of risk associated with the portfolios of informal 
lenders.  
 
Table 3 confirms that the combined informal sector is important in Vietnam with 36 per cent of the 
total number of loans in 2002. The interest bearing segment made up only 14 percentage points 
hereof and about half in value terms. This suggests that poor rural households in Vietnam continue 
to rely on networks and relatives when they try to deal with shocks and face hard times. This is in 
line with what is generally found in the literature on rural households in developing countries, see 
Platteau (1997). 
 
Looking at the changes in the structure of the credit market it is of interest to relate these to 
potential changes in the use of approved loans. Table 4 shows that such changes were limited in the 
sample.11 It is highlighted that to increase the probability that the correct use of each loan was 
elicited, we asked both about the stated purpose in the loan application and about what the loan was 
actually used for.12 Combining answers to these two questions suggests that loans were generally 
used as stated in the applications. In all years differences were identified in less than 5 percent of 
the loans, and these differences are not systematic in any way. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
(b) Land and credit market interaction 
 
Credit is obtained for many reasons, such as consumption smoothening and investment. Investment 
in land (including in particular land transactions) is critically important for the development of a 
market based economy and for the efficiency of the economy in general. It is therefore of interest to 
uncover any interactions between the credit and land markets. The credit and land sections of the 
ILSSA questionnaire were on this background designed to capture such relationships through a 
variety of questions; and it is apparent from the data that land (especially with a red book) is widely 
used as collateral in Vietnam.  
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In Long An province no less than 99 percent of the total number of loans involved collateral in the 
form of land with a red book. In Ha Tay, Phu Tho and Quang Nam the corresponding shares were 
31, 77 and 63 percent. Thus, land plays not only a significant – but a fundamental – role in 
determining the operation of the credit market, including who gets access to credit. The opposite 
statement cannot be made. There is almost no credit-based land acquisition reflected in the data as 
would be the case in a more developed market economy. Only six loans were granted for buying 
land during the period studied. This appears credible, partly since there is no evidence in the data 
that the use of loans was misstated, and partly because of the still underdeveloped nature of land 
ownership and land transactions in Vietnam.  
 
(c) Rural credit in 2002 
 
In this section we look in more detail at loans obtained in 2002. It is the most recent year from 
which data are available, and they provide the best up-to-date picture of the rural credit market in 
Vietnam. Table 5 illustrates some subtle differences between loans obtained in the different 
segments of the loan market. Arguably, the definition of the formal segment is broad (see the list of 
institutions in Appendix A). Nevertheless, the differences are illuminating. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The differences in terms of volume and loan size were already evident from Table 3. Loans from 
the formal sector have an average duration of 15 months. The duration is shorter in the interest 
carrying informal sector, but with an average of nine months, it is clear that this segment of the loan 
market is not only used for short term purposes. Borrowing from friends and relatives at zero 
interest is either for a short period or no specific duration is agreed for the loan. A total of 87 
percent of the loans among friends have no formal length specified, suggesting that this kind of loan 
typically involves lending among family members or close friends. Around half (56 percent) of the 
interest carrying informal loans from private lenders also have no duration specified. This suggests 
that some households may be at risk of not generating enough income to enter into specified 
agreements, including regularly scheduled payments. Studying this group in greater detail would be 
highly policy relevant from a vulnerability point of view, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The default rate is the percentage of loans in each segment where households have defaulted, 
including non-payment of interest or repayment of the principal. The magnitude of the figures is 
hard to assess. One reason is that the principal is paid in full at the end of the loan term for most 
formal loans, so only interest payments are made regularly. Paying both interest and principal at the 
end of the agreed loan period is also quite common. Thus, an eight percent default rate within a 
period of one year (as shown in Table 5) is substantial if this involves non-payment of interest only. 
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On the other hand, it is not clear from the data whether this payment came forward sometime later 
or whether the household simply stopped paying instalments on the loan. 
 
Collateral is used for 70 percent of all formal loans whereas no collateral is needed in the informal 
sector. Land with red book is used as collateral in the majority of the loans. House and land without 
red book are also used, but to a lower degree, and there are as already alluded to significant regional 
differences in the use of collateral.  
 
Table 5 confirms that Ha Tay and Phu Tho both have about 50 percent of the loans in the formal 
segment, whereas Long An and Quang Nam have much higher shares for this sector. In Long An 
almost 90 percent of the loans originate in the formal sector. This corresponds well with the 
perception that southern Vietnam (where Long An is situated) is relatively more ‘market-based’ 
than other regions of the country. Similarly, although households in Quang Nam obtain close to 80 
percent of their loans in the formal sector, it is clear that very few households obtain any credit at 
all, reflecting the very underdeveloped nature of the economy of this province. 
 
The above differences suggest that different segments in the loan market serve different needs. In 
Table 6 this is further explored by tabulating the use of loans in the three credit segments. The 
formal sector focuses almost entirely on demand for production loans and asset accumulation.13 A 
higher share of loans from the informal sector is directed towards health expenditure and 
consumption. These loans are likely to be due to household shocks or unforeseen events. They carry 
a higher interest rate than those obtained in the formal sector, showing that households seem to 
prefer loans from the informal sector to cope with shocks and unforeseen events due to lower 
transaction costs and more flexible terms of lending. It is also worth noting that more than 50 
percent of the interest bearing loans from the informal sector is for production purposes, 
demonstrating the importance of this loan segment for the growth process of Vietnam.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT DEMAND 
 
Basic characteristics and differences between the formal and informal credit markets were in focus 
above. In this section, an econometric framework is applied to identify more rigorously the 
determinants of credit demand at the household level. We restrict ourselves to credit demand in 
2002 since this is the most recent year for which data are available and as such provide the most up-
to-date picture of credit demand in Vietnam. Moreover, focusing on 2002 allows us to consider the 
explanatory variables relied on in this section as pre-determined as further discussed below. 
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In a setup where only matched (i.e. approved) loan applications are observable, the analyst cannot 
hope to identify correctly the characteristics affecting real credit demand at the household level. 
However, even with knowledge about rejected loan applications, identification of ‘self constrained’ 
households is normally complex and challenging. We are fortunate in the present paper that we 
have the information required to address these identification problems. Consequently, we are able to 
categorize households as demanding credit if they (i) obtained a loan, (ii) had a loan rejected or (iii) 
did not apply even if they wanted credit.  
 
A probit model describes the demand for credit. The underlying structural framework is a 
household production model with utility maximizing households, who demand credit (demand = 1) 
if a loan is expected to increase utility, and they do not demand credit (demand = 0) in the opposite 
case.  Thus,  
 
( 1) ( , ,i c pP demand F H X D )= =  
where  is a vector of household characteristics, iH cX captures village characteristics and  
represents province dummies.  
pD
 
At the household level human capital controls include age and education of the household head, a 
proxy for the information level (a dummy capturing whether the newspaper ‘People’ is read or not), 
and productive assets. These are total land holdings and squared land holdings, number of adults as 
a proxy for labour power, and feed expenditure as a proxy for the size of livestock holdings. We 
also control for the value of total household assets and the need for obtaining credit by including the 
number of dependents. Furthermore, a proxy is included to capture shocks at the household level in 
the form of a dummy showing whether a household member was hospitalized within the last 12 
months. The gender of the household head is also included, and we control for ‘connectedness’ 
through the use of a dummy, indicating whether anyone in the household has acquaintances in the 
existing credit institutions.14 Credit history is controlled for through the variable ‘not paid’ 
capturing whether a household has defaulted, i.e. not made a repayment on a loan in full or in part 
on a loan obtained prior to 2001. Finally, we take account of the influence of security of land tenure 
by including the share of household land area for which a red book is in hand.  
 
Village level information includes distance to the district centre where BARD/VBP has an office, 
and four province dummies capture whether households live in Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam or 
Long An. 
  
In the present analysis data for the following explanatory variables originate from the VHLSS 2002: 
age, gender, education, adults, dependents, feed, total assets, total assets squared, distance, 
information, and hospitalization. These data were collected about one year before the ILSSA 
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survey. They therefore precede our information on credit demand in 2002 by about one year. This 
allows us to treat these data as pre-determined. In addition to the provincial dummies, data for the 
remaining explanatory variables, i.e. total land, total land squared, connections, credit history and 
possession of a red book, come from the ILSSA survey. Since land ownership was collected with a 
time dimension we can use the amount of land owned in 2001, which is exogenous to credit demand 
in 2002. Connectedness is measured by a dummy variable constructed based on responses to 
whether anyone in the sampled households has contacts in the existing credit institutions. To ensure 
this variable is exogenous we also asked about the nature of the relationship.  
 
Two sets of summary statistics are given in Table 7. The first two columns show for each variable 
the number of observations for which data is available in the total sample of 932 households used in 
Section 3. However, information is missing on distance and total assets for respectively 40 and 15 
households (with no overlap). In addition, two households had no land in 2001. Accordingly, the 
last five columns provide summary statistics for the 875 households used in the empirical analysis, 
and they will be referred to as the full sample in what follows.15
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
It is clear from Table 7 that the reduction in sample size due to missing observations is not 
important. Means change very little. The age of the household head ranges from 22 to 93 years, and 
some 20 percent households are female headed. In addition, the education variable confirms that 
household heads have on average more than six years of schooling. Other observations include that 
while the average land area is small (i.e. around two thirds of a hectare) there are indeed a few 
households with large landholdings and substantial assets in the form of livestock. Moreover, 19 
percent of all households in the full sample had at least one member in hospital during 2002, and 21 
percent of households read the newspaper ‘People’. Finally, some 8 percent of households have 
defaulted on a loan, and 79 percent of the total household land area was registered with a red book. 
 
We hypothesize that productive capital (land holdings, number of adults and livestock holdings) 
will affect the propensity to demand credit positively. For example, the greater the landholdings the 
more likely a farmer is to demand credit to provide access to fertilizer and other inputs. The 
coefficient on the education of the household head is likewise expected to have a positive sign as 
greater ability and human capital should affect investment possibilities. Similarly, being better 
connected, informed and with secure land rights in the form of red books should have a positive 
impact on credit demand. Finally, many dependents and a person hospitalized in the last 12 months 
are proxies for a higher probability of the household being in need of credit. They are thus more 
likely to have a loan demand. 
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A priori expectations about the signs of the variables capturing the age and sex of the household 
head and credit history are less clear. A number of different arguments may hold, so these variables 
are included as controls without well defined priors. The same can be said for the total asset base, 
which could theoretically affect the probability of obtaining a loan both negatively and positively. A 
larger asset base would tend to make self financing of loans more viable. On the other hand, it may 
also improve the loan terms, which the household are offered, making it cheaper to obtain a loan.  
 
It is expected that the distance (village) coefficient is negative. The further away the household lives 
from the district centre the more costly it is for the household to obtain the loan, due to for example 
travel costs. This argument will not necessarily hold if the household directs demand towards a 
local moneylender. Yet, in remote villages local moneylenders are likely to hold more monopoly 
lending power, demanding stricter repayment conditions (which we do not control for) and thus 
discourage demand for credit. 
 
Table 8 reports the marginal effects on the probability of demanding credit for two sets of 
regressions. The first regression includes all of the 875 households in our full sample. In the second 
regression, this sample is reduced by removing 58 households, who obtained a zero interest loan 
from friends. The motives for obtaining credit in this situation may differ from the framework set 
up above, and we wish to uncover whether this is so. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
It emerges from Table 8 that the regressions based on the full and the reduced sample are actually 
quite similar. Signs are (with one insignificant exception) the same for all variables. Nevertheless, 
even if the general interpretation is the same for the full and the reduced sample, it is noteworthy 
that the coefficients for the location dummies for Quang Nam and Long An change size. The same 
goes for the level of significance of the Long An dummy, which is significant at the 1 percent level 
in the reduced sample. The level of statistical significance of the gender variable turns insignificant 
in the reduced sample whereas it is significant at the 5 percent level in the full sample. Leaving 
detailed interpretations aside for a moment this certainly suggests that while generalisations are 
indeed possible at the broad level of aggregation used here, it is advisable to be careful about the 
household group and credit segment in question. This point is in even more focus below. 
 
The results also confirm as expected that land is a statistically significant determinant of credit 
demand, and the non-linear nature of this relationship is confirmed by the significant influence of 
squared land. The turning point is 78,200 m2 compared with the mean of 6,500 m2. Thus, all but 
nine households are located before the turning point. There are as already referred to above many 
reasons for expecting that land should be significant, and it is reassuring that this reflected in the 
data. The connectedness variable is positive, large and strongly significant in both samples, which 
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confirms that being connected has clear and a positive impact on credit demand. The same goes as 
expected for the number of adults, whereas total assets have a negative and significant coefficient. 
This suggests that total assets per se lead to less credit demand, but the counter veiling and 
statistically significant influence of the squared term should not be overlooked. The turning point is 
at 39.3 Mill. VND and is three times greater than the mean, implying that for the overwhelming 
majority of the households there is a negative relationship between asset holdings and credit 
demand. The age of the household head is also significant, but the older the household head the less 
credit is demanded. This in all likelihood reflects that older people in the provinces studied are more 
settled and less likely to take new and capital demanding initiatives. Cultural values may play a role 
here as well.  
 
Table 8 reveals very interesting differences in credit demand among the provinces under study. 
Recalling that Ha Tay is the base, there are no significant differences in the location dummy 
between Ha Tay and Phu Tho, whereas Quang Nam and Long An show respectively large negative 
and large positive coefficients, which are in both cases statistically significant. Credit demand is 
relatively high in Long An and relatively low in Quang Nam and this corresponds well with their 
respective level of development, confirming that credit issues are going to remain key challenges as 
the transformation of the Vietnamese economy proceeds. Finally, among the statistically significant 
variables, it is clear that (i) the male gender dummy is negative and significant (in the full sample) 
suggesting that males are less prone to demand credit, and (ii) the livestock control variable is 
indeed important with a positive sign, reflecting that when a household has productive assets (in this 
case livestock) the demand for credit goes up.  
 
Turning to the variables, which are not statistically significant, it is important to keep in mind that 
pooling demand for formal and informal credit risks blurring the picture of rural credit demand. It is 
likely that there are some differences in the way in which the various households and other 
characteristics drive formal credit relative to informal credit demand. Distance to the district centre 
(office of a formal lender) may for example be negatively related to demand for formal credit and 
positively related to demand for informal credit. It is also sensible to expect that households with a 
problematic credit history are more likely to demand credit through the informal market. Finally, it 
is probably also correct that negative shocks like having a household member hospitalized is more 
directly correlated with informal credit demand. Households may well perceive it as difficult to 
obtain consumption loans from formal credit sources.   
 
To explore this, Table 9 presents results of probit regressions where formal and informal credit 
demand is studied separately in a bivariate probit model where non-independence in the error term 
is allowed for. Thus, using i to indicate households, 
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*
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*
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i i i i
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z if z q otherwise demand for formal credit
z if z q otherwise demand for informal credit
β ε
β ε
= = + >
= = + >
)
)
 
 
where 1iε  and 2iε  have mean zero and unit variance (for normalisation), such that formally 
1 2( , )i iε ε ~ (0,0,1,1, )zbinorm ρ , and zρ  is the coefficient of correlation. jq  is a vector of explanatory 
variables with the first element being one, and jβ  a conformable vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, . Our interest is whether factors determining credit demand differ between the 
formal and informal sectors, thus we ask whether
1,2j =
1 2q q= . 
 
The reported test for independence between the equations shows that the null hypothesis of 
independence cannot be rejected. Specifying an individual probit regression for each equation 
yields almost the exact same result (not reported) as the bivariate model. 
 
For completeness, an additional regression for demand for informal credit (univariate probit model) 
is reported. In this case the full sample is reduced for the same reasons as discussed in relation to 
Table 8.  
 
As regards the distinction between formal credit, on the one hand, and informal credit, on the other, 
it is clear that this suggests why some of the insignificant statistical results were obtained in Table 
8. The first four columns of Table 9 show that counter veiling impacts between the formal and 
informal credit market segments are involved when it comes to education, distance, credit history 
and the red books, which tend to make the overall effect in Table 8 insignificant. Moreover, while 
hospitalization shocks are insignificant, this variable does nevertheless approach importance in the 
informal credit market (where it is for example almost significant in the reduced sample of the 
informal market), while the opposite is true for total assets. Finally, it can be noted that there are a 
couple of variables, which are significant in the aggregate sample due to their particular importance 
in the formal credit market. This goes for total land size, for example. Land size is significant 
overall, but not for informal credit demand, whereas the opposite is true for the number of 
dependents. 
 
Comparing the demand for informal credit in respectively the full and the reduced sample, credit 
history turns significant in the reduced sample. Also the distance variable seems to turn more 
significant, but while positive as one might expect the parameter remains insignificant. There are a 
variety of other changes, including that the level of statistical significance changes for the Long An 
dummy, total assets, number of dependents, age and not paid. Moreover, the size of coefficients 
does vary. Yet, the only variable that actually changes sign is gender. Overall, it is fair to state that 
 13
the demand for informal credit is in broad terms similar for the two groups. Signs remain the same 
and they are generally as expected.  
 
In sum, the only variables in Tables 8 and 9 for which little systematic influence on credit demand 
can be uncovered one way or the other appear to be the information variable and hospitalization, 
which are admittedly rather crude proxies. Moreover, the data suggest as just alluded to that a key 
underlying distinction between formal and informal credit demand is that formal demand is 
particularly driven by a factor such as total land, which reflects the need for credit for production 
and the management of assets whereas age is insignificant.  In contrast, informal credit is, in 
addition to being negatively associated with age and education positively dependent on the variable 
‘not paid’ and on the number of dependents, reflecting household need to smooth consumption and 
address external shocks. When households have assets they are better able to manage these needs 
without relying on informal credit as reflected in the coefficient of total assets, which is only 
statistically significant in the informal sector. Yet, being connected, for example, is statistically 
important throughout.  
 
Finally, when it comes to provincial differences striking results stand out. Ha Tay, which is the 
base, appears quite similar to Phu Tho in overall credit demand, although Phu Tho does appear to 
have more active credit demand as suggested by the positive coefficients of this dummy. The other 
side of this, i.e. why Ha Tay has less credit demand than Phu Tho is not entirely clear from the data, 
but qualitative information does suggest that governance issues at provincial level may be the 
underlying cause.16 Turning to Quang Nam, this province is clearly a relatively underdeveloped 
province (as compared to Ha Tay) in terms of both formal and informal credit demand, whereas 
Long An stands out as the most developed province.  The Long An dummy affects formal credit 
demand positively and informal credit demand negatively in a statistically significant manner. All in 
all, the statistical results confirm that location specific circumstances (including the general level of 
development) are critical in understanding credit demand.  
 
5. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT RATIONING 
(a) Rationing by formal lenders, BARD 
 
The Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (BARD) is as shown in Table 2 by far the largest 
single lender to rural households in Vietnam, accounting for around one third of the total market in 
volume and more than half when loan size is accounted for.17 It is therefore central to rural 
development that credit is disbursed efficiently by the BARD. While a complete evaluation of the 
lending practices of BARD is outside the scope of the present paper, our data make it possible to 
identify both the characteristics of households, who obtained credit from BARD, and the 
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characteristics of households, who had their application turned down. The sample size for those, 
who got their application rejected, becomes fairly small, so results should be interpreted as 
indicative only.  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Table 10 displays the mean values of the variables examined in Section 4. Total land holdings and 
total assets are larger for households, who were approved for a loan than for rejected households. 
However, the difference between the two groups is only statistically significant for total land 
holdings. Likewise for sex and the dummies for Phu Tho and Long An. Households residing in Phu 
Tho are ‘overrepresented’ among the rejected households whereas the opposite holds for Long An. 
Interestingly, if any gender discrimination is present it is a bias against men. Worth noting is also 
that education and family size are both larger (although not significant) in the rejected group; and 
loan default rates are clearly important in explaining rejection, at least for other formal lenders and 
informal lenders. In the province of Quang Nam few households apply for a loan and few 
households are rejected, in line with the results for credit demand analysed in Section 4.  
 
Given that BARD specialises in production lending with relatively large loans compared to the 
other lending institutions (see Table 6) the findings in Table 10 are sensible. They once again spell 
out that the regional differences in the credit market are substantial and they illustrate that BARD is 
focusing its lending on relatively large land and livestock holders.18
 
(b) Characteristics of credit rationed households 
 
Earlier theoretical literature on rural credit markets in developing countries is based on the 
assumption that all households have a positive demand for credit (see Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, 
Braverman and Stiglitz 1989). Thus, all households, who have not obtained credit within a given 
period, are considered credit rationed.19 Several more recent papers have, however, documented that 
this assumption may be too restrictive in empirical analysis, see Kochar (1997). 
 
In this section we pursue this theme and identify factors at the household level, which influence the 
probability that a household with given characteristics is credit constrained. It would have been 
interesting to study the formal and informal sectors separately, but the number of households, who 
had loan applications rejected, is as already mentioned quite low.20 Nevertheless, the characteristics 
which influence credit rationing are likely to be at least similar in the formal and informal segments 
making it worthwhile to pursue the issue in the aggregated sample.  
 
 15
Importantly, a household is defined as being credit rationed if it has both applied for a loan (in 
either the formal or the informal credit market) and had the application rejected.21 In this setting the 
methodology differs from the one used in the section on credit demand. From household responses 
it can be established whether a household demands credit. However, for those households, who did 
not apply for credit, it is impossible to observe what the lender’s decision would have been had 
those households actually applied. This sample selectivity issue is addressed by specifying a 
bivariate variant of Heckman’s selection model (Wooldridge 2002) as follows: 
 
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
1 0,0 . (
1 0,0 .
i i i i
i i i i
y if y x u otherwise rationed
y if y x u otherwise applied
δ
δ
= = + >
= = + >
)
( )
 
 
Error terms are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed with zero mean, unit variance and 
correlation .uρ  Thus ~ 1 2( , )i iu u (0,0,1,1, )ubinorm ρ and  (i.e. a loan is approved or rejected) is 
observed only when . The vectors of explanatory variables,
1iy
2 0iy > 1 2,i ix x , have one as their first 
element.  The second equation is our selection equation determining characteristics, which influence 
the household decision to apply for a loan ( 2 1iy = ). Results from Section 4 are used in specifying 
this selection equation.22
 
Given that a household applies for credit ( 2 1iy = ), the outcome of the application process can be 
observed from the equation 1–  if the household were awarded the loan and zero in the case of 
rejection. Characteristics at the household, commune and province level are aggregated together in 
respectively 
1 1iy =
1ix  and 2ix  to ease notation. 
 
This simultaneous approach allows us to try to identify determinants of credit rationing taking into 
account the possible selection bias in households applying for credit. Testing independence between 
the two equations is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that uρ  equals zero.  
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
Table 11 displays the results from four different specifications of the equation determining the 
probability of a household being rationed. The first column (base applied) shows the coefficients 
from the selection equation, including all of the variables used in Section 4. Although not 
completely comparable – since demanding and having applied for a loan differ in some 
circumstances, it is instructive to compare the results from the selection equation with those in 
Table 8. In fact, except for the education variable, which is in both cases largely insignificant, all 
signs of the coefficients as well as their level of significance are consistent between Tables 11 and 
8. Thus, land, numbers of adults, livestock and being connected increase the probability of having 
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applied for a loan, whereas the total assets variable decreases this probability. Also, residing in 
Quang Nam lowers the propensity to apply for a loan substantially whereas the opposite is true for 
Long An. 
 
Our base specification of rationing is shown in column two (specification 1). We include only 
variables, which are believed to affect the borrower’s ability to pay back the loan, and which are (at 
least in principle) observable to the lender, together with provincial dummies. Thus, we include 
land and assets (and their squared), education,23 feed expenditures as a proxy for livestock holdings, 
credit history and the share of land for which the borrower has a red book. This last variable is a 
proxy of the borrower’s prospective for entering the land market to secure repayment of the loan. 
Arguably, the number of adults might also be a useful indicator of repayment ability. We do not 
include it in the rationed base since the lender is in effect unable to monitor the effort to repay. It 
might be possible for the lender to force sale of land in case of default, but not to force people to get 
an income-generating job. Including adults bring no qualitative changes to the result (not reported). 
 
A bad credit history and education are significant with the expected signs. Also the coefficients for 
land, assets and the share of land with a red book are as expected, although they fail conventional 
significance tests. The (scaled) turning points for the land and assets variables are well above the 
sample means; having more land and a greater asset base diminish the risk of getting an application 
rejected. The larger the share of land for which the household has a red book the lower the 
probability of being rejected credit. The provincial dummies reveal that there are no differences of 
any significance in rationing among the four provinces studied here. Thus, the probability of having 
a loan application approved is, once we control for the propensity to apply for credit, not 
statistically different among the various provinces considered here. The only variable, which does 
not conform to our prior, is the proxy for livestock. A lender should be more willing to lend if the 
borrower has livestock which can be sold in case of default. In contrast, the coefficient on feed is 
positive, suggesting a greater possibility of being rejected, but the feed variable is insignificant. 
 
Finally, the hypothesis of all coefficients (excluding the constant) being equal to zero in the 
rationing equation is rejected at less than 1 percent (Wald statistic of 101.07, Chi2 distributed with 
12 degrees of freedom), and it appears that the selection framework is in the present case not strictly 
necessary as the independence of equations cannot be rejected. 
 
In specifications 2, 3 and 4, we augment the rationed base regression with other variables from 
Table 8, but which should not in theory affect lender decisions given the information contained in 
the variables from the base regression. In column three (specification 2), we include age and gender 
of the head of household. It is evidently of interest to uncover whether systematic biases against 
women are present in the process of reviewing credit applications. Encouragingly, we find no such 
bias. Keeping in mind that the gender variable has woman household head as its base, the data 
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suggest that women who apply for credit are in fact more likely to be approved for a loan. This is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, whereas the corresponding age parameter is clearly 
insignificant. With respect to the other base line variables, signs, magnitudes and significance levels 
are virtually unchanged for all variables, the exception being the possession of a red book, which is 
significant in specification 2. Again the test of independence of equations cannot be rejected. 
 
The third specification (in column 4) looks at the effect of distance to a district centre (distance) and 
a proxy for the household information level (information). We retain the education variable from 
specification 2 since coefficients on the information variable might be driven by systematic 
differences in education levels between households with and without information. Qualitatively the 
results are the same when we do not control for education (not reported). We offer no prior 
expectations about the sign of the distance coefficient; but outreach is of particular concern, so 
insights on the importance of this variable is potentially important information in assessing how 
credit should be expanded in rural Vietnam. The rationed baseline variables remain virtually 
unchanged in terms of signs and magnitudes. In fact, specification 3 changes very little, and while 
distance has a negative and information a positive parameter, they are clearly statistically 
insignificant. Information has very little explanatory power with a t-value of 0.19, and the t-value of 
distance is not much higher at 0.25.  
 
Finally, in the fourth specification we try to isolate the effect of being well connected (with respect 
to contacts in credit institutions. This is done by introducing a dummy variable equal to one if the 
household has contacts in any credit organisation. The estimated coefficient is negative, which 
corresponds to stating that being well connected within credit institutions promotes the application 
process. But this parameter is not statistically significant with a t-statistic of 1.26. Once again the 
test of independence of equations cannot be rejected. 24   
 
Looking at the four sets of simultaneous regressions overall it is evident that the signs of the 
coefficients in the base regression are very robust. Households with older heads are less likely to 
apply for credit. All else equal, elder households are less likely to undertake risks (i.e. apply for 
loan where repayment is uncertain), but when they apply they neither gain particular preferential 
treatment nor are they rationed. The size of the landholding is significant to the selection process, 
but land is not a variable on the basis of which rationing takes place. There is statistically speaking 
no pronounced difference between male and female headed households in the selection process, but 
it certainly does appear safe to assert that women are not being discriminated against. The data 
actually suggest the opposite with a statistically significant positive parameter in specification 2. It 
seems likely that better educated households are more likely to know when an application will be 
rejected and the data strongly suggest that once they have applied they are not being discriminated, 
quite the contrary. The better educated the household head, the better the probability of approval.  
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Feed, i.e. the measure of assets in the form of livestock, has the expected positive sign in the 
selection, but plays no role in rationing. This is slightly surprising since if a household decides to 
apply for a loan then – everything else equal – the ability to repay measured in terms of assets, 
which can be transferred to the lender should be negatively related to the probability of being 
rationed. Yet, we also note that the relevant parameters in the rationing equations are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, as one would expect, the indicator for a bad credit history (not paid), which indicates 
that a household have defaulted on a loan instalment previously, is positively related to being credit 
rationed. Yet, it does not appear to deter household from applying in any statistically significant 
manner. While clearly important to rural credit, overall, the possession of a red book is not 
significant when it comes to the decision to apply, but there is some indication that those 
households who have a red book are less likely to be rationed. The variable controlling for 
connections has the expected sign in the selection process, but is insignificant in rationing; while the 
household information level might be said to have the ‘wrong’ signs in both selection and rationing. 
We offer no convincing story for this result but note that this is statistically insignificant. The same 
goes for the distance parameter, though it should be kept in mind that the regressions in this section 
are pooled over formal and informal lending institutions.  
 
Turning to the province dummies, Phu Tho is statistically insignificant throughout, while Quang 
Nam and Long An are statistically significant in the selection process, but with opposite signs. 
Turning to rationing, no provincial differences emerge from our analysis. This is so even though 
households in Ha Tay are less likely to apply than households from Phu Tho and Long An as shown 
in Table 9, which is consistent with the strongly significant negative parameter of the base applied 
in Table 11. 
 
In general the sign of most coefficients as analysed in this section are in line with what we would a 
priori expect. We acknowledge that there are a few exceptions and that several variables lack 
statistical significance. However, we believe this is more likely to be a feature of the data not 
having enough variability in central variables. Given the regional differences pointed out above it is 
also likely that the dummy variables capture a bit too much of the differences in the data. Ideally 
and with unlimited data, interacting the dummies with core variables to detect province specific 
effects would be desirable. This is left for future research due to the limitations of the existing data. 
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 6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Little is known about the characteristics and the operation of the rural credit market in Vietnam. 
This paper was written with the aim of helping to fill this gap based on a new data set covering 932 
households in four provinces (Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An) surveyed in early 2003. 
In the formal analysis this data was complemented with information available in the 2002 Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). A number of general observations emerge, which 
deserve close attention in efforts to further develop the existing credit system.  
 
An active and growing rural credit market exists in Vietnam, and formal credit is clearly expanding 
its share of total credit. This is in line with the general rapid development of the economy, and 
overall interest rates have also fallen suggesting that market integration is in fact progressing. In 
parallel, a sizeable informal sector remains in existence, accounting for about one-third of all loans, 
and reflecting that poor rural households continue to rely on informal networks and relatives. 
Different segments in the loan market serve different needs, and we note that the formal sector 
focuses almost entirely on production loans and asset accumulation. In contrast, both the descriptive 
statistics and the formal analysis in this paper demonstrate that households actually demand loans 
for other purposes, such as consumption smoothening and health expenditures. Such loans are often 
obtained in response to temporary shocks (i.e. having a person hospitalized) and thus work as a 
consumption smoothing device.  
 
Because of the limited formal lending for consumption smoothening households direct this demand 
for credit at private money lenders. This may well be welfare enhancing if the money lenders offer 
alternatives preferred by the borrower. Yet, to the extent that the borrower can provide collateral 
(i.e. in the form of land) it should in theory make no difference to formal lenders whether a loan is 
used for production purposes or for temporary consumption smoothing. If the formal sector entered 
the market for non-production loans (on financially sustainable terms) this would provide borrowers 
with an alternative to private money lenders. This might well be welfare increasing, especially for 
marginalized low-income households. They have limited connections, and this characteristic is as 
shown in Sections 4 and 5 a strongly constraining factor for credit demand in both the formal and 
the informal sector. In the informal sector it is moreover typical that older and better educated 
households have less credit demand. In contrast, a larger number of dependents and a bad credit 
history tend to increase a household’s informal credit demand. This does not necessarily reflect 
market failure, but it does suggest there is need and space for careful, well designed public action in 
expanding credit facilities. The social returns of such action may well be high. 
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Yet another key characteristic of the rural credit market in Vietnam is the one-way interaction with 
the land market. Land (with a red book) is widely used as collateral and plays a fundamental role in 
the operation of the credit market. In fact, land is a statistically significant determinant of overall 
credit demand. This result is as shown in Section 4 driven by formal credit demand geared towards 
production purposes and asset management. We therefore note that the econometric analysis in 
Section 5 also suggests that households with limited land risk being credit rationed. This further 
reinforces the above conclusion about the need for carefully metered public action; but it is in 
parallel striking that there is almost no credit-based land acquisition in rural areas. This highlights 
the very considerable challenges, which remain to be addressed in establishing the necessary market 
based institutional framework for a more efficient functioning of the economy.  
 
It comes as no surprise that land is widely used as collateral. Land is immobile and its quality 
cannot be changed at short notice. Yet, an active land market depends critically on a well 
functioning credit system for land transactions. The lack of such a market is due to both supply (i.e. 
lending institutions do not generally finance land transactions) and to the demand side. 
Accordingly, the land section of the present survey reveals that the land market among non-relatives 
is very thin indeed. However, productivity increases in rural agriculture will depend crucially on 
land consolidation and development in the years to come. The demand for loans to finance land 
transactions may appear small at present, but formal lending institutions should actively prepare for 
a more active role in this market. This will as well require that complementary institutions are put in 
place with the capacity to value land, and also an effective legal system to solve potential land 
disputes will be required. 
 
The most striking and cross-cutting general insight emerging from this paper is the extent of 
regional differences in almost all aspects of the credit market. Some broad national generalizations 
are as already discussed possible. At the same time, it is in designing public policy indispensable to 
be very careful about the region, the household group and the market segment in question. The 
formal sector accounts for around 50 percent of loans in Ha Tay and Phu Tho. Long An and Quang 
Nam have much higher shares, but this characteristic is a reflection of very different levels of 
development in these two provinces. Few households in Quang Nam obtain credit, and credit 
demand in this province is clearly limited compared to the other provinces in our sample. This is so 
both overall and in the various market segments. We therefore highlight that pooling demand for 
formal and informal credit risks blurring the picture of rural credit demand. Counter veiling effects 
are at work between the formal and informal credit segments when it comes to education, distance, 
credit history and also the provincial dummy effects differ. 
 
In sum, the econometric analysis confirms that specificity and the general level of development are 
fundamental in understanding credit demand in Vietnam. A ‘one size fits all’ approach to expanding 
credit is not going to be the most effective. This dimension therefore needs to be kept in mind in the 
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planned expansion of rural credit through the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. The VBSP aims at 
operating a large number of new branches throughout Vietnam (World Bank 2003). An additional 
observation in this regard is that expansion needs to be carefully metered to take account of the 
need for credit in areas where access is presently low – such as in Quang Nam. In Ha Tay and Phu 
Tho the informal sector is sizeable and as such compensate for an insufficiently developed formal 
sector, whereas the formal market is already much better developed in Long An. It is in this context 
also to be noted as shown in Section 5 that BARD is focusing its lending on relatively large land 
and livestock holders, but we stress that regional differences in credit rationing seems to be limited. 
The provincial dummies are insignificant once selection is accounted for. In Quang Nam few 
households apply for credit and few are rejected. On the other hand, the analysis in Section 5 
reveals that households with a bad credit history are more likely to get rationed. This merits 
attention as these households in all likelihood include those households, who are subject to shocks 
and who find it difficult to manage their lives. It would given the regional differences pointed out 
above be desirable to interact the provincial dummies with the core variables to detect province 
specific effects. Yet, this is left for future research due to the limitations of the existing data. 
 
We finally conclude by noting that it is encouraging that this study found no evidence of gender 
discrimination. The data actually suggest the opposite. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 See for example Kovsted et al. (2004). 
2 See Duong and Izumida (2002) and McCarty (2001) for earlier work on rural credit and microfinance issues in 
Vietnam. 
3 For documentation and the questionnaire used see Barslund et al. (2004).  
4 Some 28 households interviewed during the VHLSS could not be interviewed and had to be excluded in the ILSSA 
survey.  
5 The following website http://www.worldbank.org.vn/data/household_survey.htm provides access to a complete 
description of the 2002 VHLSS and the questionnaire. 
6 Retrospective questions always entail a risk of imprecise or erroneous answers. However, obtaining a loan is not an 
‘every year’ event and as such is more likely to be remembered correctly than more recurring events. Furthermore, 
taking out a loan often coincides with ‘big’ events such as major shocks or purchases, which are likely to be recalled 
correctly.  
7 The credit market section of the ILSSA survey is Module B (questions 168-224), with three sections: B1 for loans 
actually received, B2 for loans not received, and B3 on general questions. 
8 The VBP has recently been renamed the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). BARD and VBP are associated in 
the sense that they often share office facilities. See World Bank (2003) and Kovsted et al. (2004) for a more detailed 
description of the institutional set up. 
9 Private Trader was also a category in the questionnaire. It turned out that this group does not play an important role in 
the credit market in the four provinces studied. 
10 See appendix A for the full list of institutions included in the questionnaire. 
11 If loans for primary consumption are only obtainable from informal sources and there is a general increase in 
incomes, which makes consumption loans less needed, a change in the composition of loans may be expected. Similarly 
if it is easier to obtain loans for specific purposes such as production, rather than for consumption smoothening or 
health purposes. 
12 The questions were, respectively: “What was the stated purpose of the loan (select one for each loan)?” and “What 
did your household mainly use the loan for (select one for each loan)?” 
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13 This includes buying/building a house, the few instances of buying land and re-lending and buying other assets. 
14 The question was: “Does anyone in your household know anyone who works in one of the following institutions?” 
The household then had to indicate the answer for each institution. 
15 All regressions were also carried out on a sample excluding outliers, defined as observations, situated outside an 
interval of three standard deviations from the mean. All qualitative results remained unchanged. Full tables are available 
on request. 
16 See Mekong Economics (2004). 
17 The second most important state bank, Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) has recently been reorganised and is now 
operating under the umbrella of the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), which is scheduled for a large expansion 
in the years to come (World Bank 2003).  
18 While a general characteristic, this effect does to some extent reflect higher BARD lending activity in Long An, 
which also tends to have larger farms. 
19 In what follows, the terms credit constrained and credit rationed are used interchangeably. 
20 In 2002, 25 households in the sample of the 875 had their loan application rejected by a lending institution (formal 
and informal). For the sample of 932 households the number was 29 households. 
21 In fact a household may be approved for a loan smaller than it applied for. These households are also to some extent 
credit rationed. We asked questions about amount obtained, amount wanted and amount applied for to identify 
households rationed in the loan amount. In our sample 21 households reported (credibly) that they were rationed in the 
amount they obtained in 2002. For simplicity these households are considered not rationed in the present study. The 
qualitative results hold if we include the 21 household (except three households which were rationed in large loan 
amounts) as rationed. 
22 It is recalled that the definitions for households demanding credit and applying for credit differ as described above. 
23 See Nga Nguyet Nguyen (2004) who reports significantly increasing returns to schooling in recent years. 
24 A fifth specification with the remaining three variables from Table 8, i.e. including Adults, Dependents, and 
Hospitalization was also carried out. This changed none of the key results discussed, and provided no further insights except that the 
number of dependents is potentially important. This specification is therefore left out here, but results are available on request. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Lending institutions in the questionnaire: 
 
Bank for the Poor (includes National Poverty Alleviation Program)   
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development    
Other State-Owned Bank      
National Employment Generation Program    
Other National Government Program     
Other (non National) Poverty Alleviation Program    
Private Bank       
Farmers’ Union      
Veterans’ Union      
Women’s Union      
People’s Credit Funds      
Other Credit Associations      
Private Trader      
State Owned Enterprise (SOE)       
International Organisation      
Private Money Lender      
Friends/Relatives      
Other (please specify)      
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APPENDIX B 
 
List of variables 
Name in tables Definition Source 
Demand for credit Dummy variable equal to 1 if household demanded credit in 2002 ILSSA 2002 
Age Age of household head in years VHLSS 2002 
Total land Total landholdings in 1,000 m2 ILSSA 2002 
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is male and equal to 0 if 
household head is female 
VHLSS 2002 
Education Education of household head, number of years of schooling VHLSS 2002 
Adults Number of adults defined as household members between 15 and 65 
years of age and not studying 
VHLSS 2002 
Dependents  Number of dependents are full time students and household members 
aged less than 15 or above 65 years 
VHLSS 2002 
Feed Expenditures on livestock feed during last 12 months in mill. Dong VHLSS 2002 
Province dummies Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam, Long An.  ILSSA 2002 
Total assets Total value of assets in mill. Dong VHLSS 2002 
Distance Distance to district centre in km VHLSS 2002 
Hospitalization Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one household member hospitalized 
within the last 12 months and equal to 0 is no member hospitalized 
VHLSS 2002 
Connections Dummy variable equal to 1 if anyone in the household has contacts in the 
existing credit institutions 
ILSSA 2002 
Red book The share of household land area for which a red book is in hand ILSSA 2002 
Information Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household reads the newspaper People VHLSS 2002 
Alternative information Index where having a radio counts 0.5 and a television 1 VHLSS 2002 
Got help Dummy equal one if the household at some point prior to 2001 got help 
from the authorities to apply for a loan 
ILSSA 2002 
Not paid Dummy equal one if the household did at some point prior to 2001 not 
pay a loan instalment in full 
ILSSA 2002 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Households distributed by number of loans obtained, 1997-2002 
Number of loans Frequency By province (percent) 
  Ha Tay Phu Tho Quang Nam Long An 
0 289 29 18 53 23 
1 211 19 25 40 7 
2 149 22 24 4 12 
3 112 17 17 1 11 
4 52 6 8 1 6 
5 119 7 8 1 40 
Total 932 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of loans by source (percent)a
 1999 2002 
 Unweighted Weighted by 
loan amount 
Unweighted Weighted by  
loan amount 
VBP 11 5 5 2 
BARD 44 64 38 56 
Private lenders 8 6 11 4 
Relatives 23 15 24 13 
Union 9 3 12 7 
Others 5 7 10 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 
a VBP (Vietnam Bank for the Poor, now Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, VBSP), BARD 
(Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development), Private Lenders (Private moneylenders and 
traders, and friends charging interest), Relatives (relatives and friends charging zero interest), 
Union (Farmers’/Veterans’/Women’s Unions and People’s Credit Funds), Other (Other 
institutions not mentioned above – see Appendix A) 
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Table 3. Rural credit, 1997-2002 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Formal       
Loan size (Dong) 5,191 4,657 4,583 5,360 6,400 8,426 
Interest (percent per month) 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Number of loans 70 130 168 223 279 250 
Informal – interest       
Loan size (Dong) 3,222 7,686 3,196 3,206 2,468 3,904 
Interest (percent per month) 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.0 3.0 1.8 
Number of loans 9 18 24 31 47 55 
Relative – zero interest       
Loan size (Dong) 4,175 2,107 2,375 2,522 3,558 2,602 
Interest (percent per month) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of loans 20 29 51 69 76 84 
Total       
Loan size (Dong) 4,807 4,548 3,983 4,547 5,403 6,529 
Interest (percent per month) 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 
Number of loans 99 177 243 323 402 389 
Distribution by source, unweighted ( percent) 
Formal  71 73 69 69 69 64 
Informal 9 10 10 10 12 14 
Relative 20 16 21 21 19 22 
Distribution by source, weighted by loan size ( percent) 
Formal  76 75 80 81 82 83 
Informal 6 17 8 7 5 8 
Relative 18 8 13 12 12 9 
 
 
Table 4. Loan use (percent of total loans each year), 1997-2002 
Year Production 
Repayment of 
existing loan Asset accumulation Health 
General 
consumption 
1997 69 3 18 9 2 
1998 70 2 11 3 15 
1999 74 2 14 4 6 
2000 73 3 11 4 9 
2001 71 3 12 6 9 
2002 68 4 12 6 11 
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Table 5. Characteristics of loans obtained, 2002 
  Informal segment 
 Formal segment Private lenders Friends (zero interest) 
Number of loans 250 55 84 
Loan amount (Dong) 8,426 3,904 2,602 
Duration (average number of months) 15 (N=248) 9 (N=24) 4 (N=11) 
 – Unspecified duration (percent) 1 56 87 
Interest (percent per month) 0.87 1.78 0 
Collateral (percent of loans) 71 0 0 
Partial default (percent) 8 11 1 
Provinces:    
 – Ha Tay (percent) (N=126) 52 14 35 
 – Phu Tho (percent) (N=106) 50 21 29 
 – Quang Nam (percent) (N=24) 77 8 15 
 – Long An (percent) (N=118) 88 10 2 
 
 
Table 6. Use of loan by credit source (percent), 2002 
  Informal segment  
Use of loan: 
Formal 
segment 
(N = 250) 
Private lenders 
(N = 55) 
Relatives 
(zero interest) 
(N = 84) 
Total 
Production 81 55 36 68 
Repayment of other loans 4 9 1 4 
Asset accumulation 9 5 23 12 
Health expenditure  3 11 12 6 
Consumption 3 20 29 11 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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Table 7. Demand for credit: summary statistics, 2002a
 Nb Mean Nc Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
        
Demand for credit 932 0.34 875 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Age  932 47.74 875 47.61 14.31 22 93 
Total land (1,000 m2)  932 6.33 875 6.49 15.44 0.02 177 
Total land squared 932 265.5 875 280.2 1874.4 0.00 31,152 
Gender (male=1) 932 0.80 875 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Education 932 6.33 875 6.47 3.35 0 12 
Adults  932 2.44 875 2.46 1.21 0 10 
Dependents 932 1.93 875 1.96 1.18 0 6 
Feed (mill. Dong) 932 1.38 875 1.44 4.91 0 80 
Ha Tay 932 0.35 875 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Phu Tho 932 0.21 875 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Quang Nam 932 0.23 875 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Long An 932 0.21 875 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Total assets (mill. Dong) 917 12.86 875 13.02 20.91 0 370 
Total assets squared 917 589.4 875 606.3 4938.0 0 137,122
Distance (km) 892 8.82 875 8.75 8.98 0 40 
Information 932 0.22 875 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Hospitalization 932 0.20 875 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Connections 932 0.52 875 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Red book 930 0.78 875 0.79 0.35 0 1 
Not Paid 932 0.08 875 0.08 0.27 0 1 
a For complete definitions see Appendix B. 
b Total number of observations available for each variable. 
c Number of observations used in the empirical analysis. The full sample used contains 875 
households due to missing data on distance and total assets for a total of 55 households, and two 
households had no land in 2001. 
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Table 8. Determinants of credit demand, 2002a
Full sample Reduced samplebProbit regression on demand for 
credit (=1) Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Age  -0.47 3.64*** -0.36 2.75*** 
Total land (1,000 m2)  0.77 2.28** 0.73 2.36** 
Total land squared -0.005 2.45** -0.005 2.63*** 
Gender (male=1) -9.16 2.05** -5.63 1.11 
Education 0.51 0.84 0.54 0.86 
Adults  3.99 2.52** 4.09 2.60*** 
Dependents 0.31 0.23 -0.12 0.08 
Feed (mill. Dong) 0.74 2.33** 0.74 2.39** 
Phu Tho 6.34 1.11 8.24 1.33 
Quang Nam -23.13 4.17*** -16.59 2.80*** 
Long An 12.72 1.92* 19.51 2.87*** 
Total assets (mill. Dong) -0.62 2.43** -0.50 2.27** 
Total assets squared 0.01 2.50** 0.01 2.38** 
Distance (km) -0.20 0.58 -0.20 0.54 
Information -5.12 1.16 -5.44 1.15 
Hospitalization 4.96 0.99 3.72 0.78 
Connections 12.14 3.03*** 10.91 2.74*** 
Red book 3.41 0.75 4.49 0.86 
Not Paid -2.39 0.40 -4.44 0.74 
     
Number of observations 875  817  
a Coefficients on continuous variables measure the marginal effect in percentage points on the probability of demanding  
credit, whereas they measure the effect of discrete changes for the dummy variables. All marginal effects are evaluated  
at sample means. 
b The reduced sample excludes 58 households from the full sample, who obtained a zero interest loan from friends. 
*significant at 10 percent 
** significant at 5 percent 
*** significant at 1 percent 
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Table 9. Determinants of formal and informal credit demand a
Demand formal 
(full sample) 
Demand informal 
(full sample) 
Demand informal 
(reduced sample)b
Bivariate probit regression on demand for credit (=1) 
Univariate probit regression on 
demand for credit (=1) 
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Age  -0.18 1.58 -0.22 2.99*** -0.09 1.70* 
Total land (1,000 m2)  0.64 3.18*** -0.13 0.79 -0.12 1.13 
Total land squared -0.005 3.47*** 0.00 1.03 0.001 1.45 
Gender (male=1) -6.28 1.15 -2.90 1.14 0.85 0.40 
Education 0.80 1.41 -0.68 2.03** -0.67 2.52*** 
Adults  3.97 2.99*** 0.91 1.2 0.80 1.45 
Dependents 1.01 0.71 1.51 1.91* 0.76 1.34 
Feed (mill. Dong) 0.62 1.8* 0.34 2.21** 0.25 2.56*** 
Phu Tho 6.18 1.25 2.29 0.65 2.96 1.07 
Quang Nam -8.54 1.68* -14.74 7.56*** -8.11 3.56*** 
Long An 29.87 3.16*** -8.85 3.18*** -2.81 1.07 
Total assets (mill. Dong) -0.28 1.07 -0.20 2.16** -0.06 0.78 
Total assets squared 0.01 1.69* 0.00 0.59 0.000 0.23 
Distance (km) -0.11 0.42 0.16 1.02 0.18 1.63 
Information -2.99 0.71 -2.92 1.31 -2.71 1.48 
Hospitalization 2.86 0.73 4.73 1.4 3.16 1.60 
Connections 6.67 1.77* 6.96 2.98*** 4.57 3.00*** 
Red book 3.45 0.83 -4.26 1.42 -2.76 1.23 
Not Paid -3.36 0.64 7.33 1.62 4.50 1.67* 
       
Number of observations 875  875  817  
Test of independence between equations, ρ=0, p-value 0.68   
a Coefficients on continuous variables measure the marginal effect in percentage points on the probability of demanding  
credit, whereas they measure the effect of discrete changes for the dummy variables. All marginal effects are evaluated  
at sample means. 
b The reduced sample excludes 58 households from the full sample, who obtained a zero interest loan from friends. 
* significant at 10 percent 
** significant at 5 percent 
*** significant at 1 percent 
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Table 10. Household characteristics for approved and rejected loan applications by lendersa
 BARD Other Formal Lenders Informal Lenders 
Variables Approved Rejected Approved Rejected Approved Rejected 
Full 
Sample 
        
Age 46.44 47.05 46.94 44.33 45.02 47.80 47.61 
Total land (1,000 m2)b 13.52 3.66 4.43 2.54 4.52 10.72 6.49 
Gender (male=1)b 0.85 1.00 0.76 0.67 0.79 0.80 0.81 
Education 6.74 7.05 7.07 6.89 6.65 5.77 6.47 
Adults  2.79 3.16 2.62 2.44 2.51 2.66 2.46 
Dependents 1.96 1.79 1.87 1.67 2.02 2.46 1.96 
Feed (mill. Dong) 2.17 1.49 2.16 0.51 1.54 1.44 1.44 
Ha Tay 0.25 0.16 0.42 0.67 0.51 0.60 0.35 
Phu Thob 0.19 0.58 0.38 0.11 0.35 0.09 0.22 
Quang Nam  0.10 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.21 
Long Anb 0.45 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.29 0.22 
Total assets (mill. 
Dong) 19.49 12.15 11.36 6.47 10.98 11.25 13.02 
Distance (km) 9.75 12.05 7.52 11.94 9.41 7.09 8.75 
Information 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.21 
Hospitalization 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.19 
Connections 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.61 0.57 0.52 
Red book 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.74 0.69 0.79 
Not Paid 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.17 0.08 
        
Number of 
observations 209 19 124 9 186 35 875 
a Information for 2001 and 2002 is used, and variable mean values are indicated (see Appendix B for full variable 
definitions).
b Means are statistically (5 percent) different between the two first columns. 
 
 33
Table 11. Credit rationing, 2002  
Variables Base 
Applied 
1. Rationed 
Base 
2. 
(age, gender) 
3. 
(distance, 
information) 
4. 
(connections)
Age -0.34  0.11   
 3.08***  0.8   
Total land (1,000 m2)  0.60 -0.15 -0.21 -0.15 -0.20 
 1.83* 0.68 0.9 0.67 0.93 
Total land squared  -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 2.10** 1.14 1.32 1.13 1.44 
Gender (male=1) -4.21  4.83   
 1.01  1.82*   
Education -0.07 -1.12 -1.30 -1.15 -1.09 
 0.11 3.48*** 3.25*** 3.68*** 3.62*** 
Adults  3.67     
 2.70***     
Dependents  1.17     
 0.78     
Feed (mill. Dong) 0.91 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.12 
 2.35** 1.55 1.03 1.56 0.98 
Phu Tho 2.63 -3.32 -3.15 -2.87 -3.42 
 0.48 1.08 1.09 1.02 1.17 
Quang Nam -23.28 -5.48 -4.56 -5.40 -4.09 
 4.10*** 1.46 1.08 1.43 0.82 
Long An 14.15 -4.34 -5.08 -4.16 -5.59 
 2.05** 1.13 1.45 1.11 1.4 
Total assets (mill. Dong) -0.53 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 
 1.95* 0.63 0.76 0.67 0.51 
Total assets squared 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 2.09** 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.2 
Distance (km) -0.11   -0.05  
 0.31   0.25  
Information -3.77   0.63  
 0.85   0.19  
Hospitalization 4.50     
 0.95     
Connections 11.79    -3.98 
 3.24***    1.26 
Red book 3.18 -4.25 -5.22 -4.29 -4.55 
 0.67 1.29 1.67* 1.31 1.3 
Not paid 4.61 20.95 20.93 21.19 19.01 
 0.74 2.94*** 3.01*** 2.94*** 2.72*** 
Inverse Mills Ratio (ρ)  9.32 4.98 8.80 2.96 
  1.3 0.67 1.22 0.34 
Number of observations 875                           295 295 295 295 
* significant at 10 percent 
** significant at 5 percent 
*** significant at 1 percent 
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